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We report an outbreak of Neisseria meningitidis sero-
group W135, associated with a transient transmission 
event between asymptomatic individuals in a health-
care setting. Two elderly persons subsequently devel-
oped invasive meningococcal disease. The duration 
and type of close contact for those directly involved 
in the probable transmission incident would not have 
warranted chemoprophylaxis according to current 
guidelines. Meningococcal infection in older persons 
usually presents with pneumonia rather than meningi-
tis or septicaemia with purpura. 
We report a nosocomial outbreak of Neisseria menin-
gitidis serogroup W135, phenotype 2a:P1.5, 2 asso-
ciated with a transient transmission event between 
asymptomatic individuals in March 2012. Two elderly 
individuals admitted to the same hospital group (at dif-
ferent sites) presented within four days of each other 
with non-specific respiratory tract symptoms of infec-
tion. Initial microbiological analysis isolated N. menin-
gitidis serogroup W135:2a:P1.5, 2 (porA genotype 5, 2, 
36-2) from both patients’ blood cultures. The identical 
microbiological phenotype/genotype of these isolates 
suggested an epidemiological link. 
Epidemiological investigation
The epidemiological investigation revealed that both 
patients had in the preceding weeks been admitted 
to different wards in the same hospital for unrelated 
illnesses, but had not been in contact with each other 
during that stay (admitted 19 and 16 days before the 
positive blood culture result, with stays of 10 and four 
days, respectively, for the initial admission). However, 
on the day of discharge, both were transported in 
the same hospital vehicle at the same time, one to a 
rehabilitation facility and the other to a care home. 
Both became ill with non-specific symptoms (however, 
respiratory infection was thought to be the most likely 
cause) within six and 10 days after transport, respec-
tively. One patient remained at the rehabilitation unit 
for management of the disease and the other was read-
mitted to hospital for treatment. Since the most likely 
epidemiological link between the two cases was the 
short transfer journey (duration 67 minutes), naso-
pharyngeal swabs were obtained from the two staff 
members involved in the transport and another pas-
senger who was on the vehicle at the same time as the 
cases, but for less than half an hour. 
One of the transport staff (in their 60s) was also found 
to be carrying serogroup W135:2a:P1.5, 2 (porA 5, 2, 
36-2) and reported having had upper respiratory tract 
symptoms in the intervening period (symptom onset 16 
days after the patient transport), but had not sought 
medical attention. The swabs from the second transport 
team member and the other passenger were negative. 
None of the affected individuals had travelled abroad 
during the incubation period. It was not possible to 
identify the primary case or the sequence of transmis-
sion events. For this reason chemoprophylaxis was 
offered to all staff and patients who had been in close 
contact with the two infected patients during the incu-
bation period (in the hospital, the transport vehicle and 
the community) up until 24 hours after commencement 
of antibiotic treatment of the cases. Chemoprophylaxis 
and meningococcal ACW135Y quadrivalent conjugate 
vaccination was also arranged for the swab-positive 
transport staff member and their close contacts.
Subsequent multilocus sequence typing of the sam-
ples obtained from this incident confirmed the epide-
miological link between the affected individuals. All 
were determined to have the same strain designation 
W135:2a:P1.5,2:F1-1:ST-11 (cc11).
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Background information
In England and Wales, invasive meningococcal disease 
most commonly occurs in children under five years of 
age and teenagers (between the years 2006 and 2011 
at incidences of 38.6/100,000 for the under one year-
olds, 12.6/100,000 in children aged one to four years, 
and 3.2/100,000 for teenagers aged from 15 to 19 years) 
[1,2]. N. meningitidis is transmitted through direct con-
tact with infectious respiratory secretions, droplets or 
aerosols. Typically, for transmission to occur, close, 
prolonged contact (typically accepted as eight hours or 
more) is required [1,3-5]. Cases associated with public 
transport have been noted, but they involved extended 
contact over a period of hours [6]. 
Since the meningococcal serogroup C conjugate vaccine 
was introduced in 1999 to the childhood immunisation 
schedule in the United Kingdom (UK), around 85–90% 
of invasive disease cases have been due to N. menin-
gitidis serogroup B [2]. Invasive disease by the W135 
serogroup is infrequently seen. For example, between 
2006 and 2011, serogroup W135 accounted for only 
2.3% of cases (annual average: 26 W135 cases) of lab-
oratory-confirmed meningococcal disease in England 
and Wales, and most occurred in the very young or the 
very old [2]. Fatalities occurred in 5.5% of these cases, 
all in adults older than 45 years [2] (Figure)
Discussion and conclusions
In the last 10 years, most W135 organisms isolated in 
the UK were typed as W135: NT: P1.3.6 cc22 or combi-
nations thereof. In contrast, as reported in this inci-
dent, W135:2a:P1.5, 2 cc11 has been only infrequently 
observed: 32 cases from 2009 to May 2012 (personal 
communication Dr S Gray, May 2012).
The occurrence described here of invasive meningo-
coccal disease with serogroup W135 may have resulted 
from a single transient period of close contact. It is 
notable since symptoms suggestive of meningococ-
cal infection were not apparent at that point. Despite 
detailed epidemiological and microbiological analy-
sis, it was not possible to determine the sequence of 
transmission. 
Like serogroup Y, most serogroup W135 infections in 
older adults present as pneumonia (usually in the pres-
ence of comorbidities) and are invariably confirmed 
following a positive blood culture [2,7-9]. Public health 
notification on clinical suspicion of meningococcal 
Figure
Laboratory-confirmed W135 Neisseria meningitidis cases, deaths, and case fatality ratio by age group, England and Wales, 
2006–12 (n=162)
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disease is unusual in elderly persons. Where cases are 
notified in this age group, they are more likely to be 
caused by the less prevalent serogroups [2,10].
Epidemiological investigations of clonal complex 11 
(cc11) N. meningitidis serogroup C have previously 
demonstrated low levels of carriage and increased 
case fatality ratios when compared to other clonal 
complexes [11-14]. It is not known if N. meningitidis 
expressing the serogroup W135 capsular polysaccha-
ride and belonging to cc11 have similar epidemiological 
features (such as duration of carriage) as serogroup C 
ST11 organisms. Nonetheless, previous findings from 
individuals returning from the Hajj demonstrate the 
capacity of the W135 strain associated with the pilgrim-
age to cause infection in contacts up to 36 days post 
return [15].
This cluster of epidemiologically linked serogroup 
W135 infections raises important implications for the 
public health and clinical management of the disease, 
particularly in older age groups. Occupational trans-
mission of meningococcal disease has been previously 
observed, mostly in laboratory settings. Instances in 
which emergency workers have been infected have 
been seen although only from clearly symptomatic 
patients [16-18]. 
Antibiotic treatment for cases and prophylaxis for 
their contacts to eradicate carriage and therefore 
reduce local transmission is warranted. In addition, 
for contacts of cases with serogroups ACWY, conju-
gate vaccines against the specific serogroup may fur-
ther protect contacts and reduce carriage and local 
transmission [15,19]. Clinicians need to be aware that 
while N. meningitidis invasive disease is most common 
in young children and adolescents, it can occur in the 
elderly, although the presentation will probably differ 
[2]. Respiratory symptoms predominate in the elderly 
rather than clinically evident meningitis or septicaemia 
with purpura. Invasive meningococcal disease caused 
by all serogroups has a substantially higher case fatal-
ity rate in the elderly than in younger age groups. 
Comorbidities are recognised as an associated risk fac-
tor and may explain the poorer outcome [2]. 
Cases of invasive meningococcal disease occurring 
in older persons should receive equally robust pub-
lic health investigation and management as those in 
younger individuals. Although the duration and type 
of close contact for the individuals exposed in the 
ambulance as described here would not have fulfilled 
the criteria for chemoprophylaxis according to current 
national public health guidelines, the common epide-
miological links allowed appropriate control measures 
to be implemented. Defining close contacts in inci-
dents where a healthcare source is suspected may be 
problematic technically and also may provoke anxiety 
for those involved. A flexible approach utilising expert 
public health advice to guide intervention is therefore 
appropriate for this type of occurrence [5]. 
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